The technological constraints on sustaining production chains has been discussed extensively by development economists, but the role of …nancial linkages has received less attention. In a model of "recursive moral hazard" for a manufacturing supply chain, we show that the structure of interlocking receivables and payables serve as the glue for the production chain that sustains complex manufacturing output. We formulate a theoretical framework where the ine¢ ciency associated with recursive moral hazard can be mitigated through optimal delays in payments along the chain. However, e¢ ciency requires large stocks of working capital and invoice prices are high due to implicit amortization costs of inter-…rm credit.
Introduction
The importance of sectoral linkages and complementarities for economic development are timeless themes, discussed in the classics of the subject such as Leontief (1936) and Hirschman (1958) . Equally, the technological challenges in building up and sustaining production chains has been well-recognized by economists. Indeed, development economists have cited the technical di¢ -culties in sustaining long production chains as a prime reason for the large disparities in the productivity between advanced and developing countries.
The O-ring theory of Kremer (1993) starts with the observation that in any production process, there are many potential problems with an individual link in the chain. In advanced economies, there are enough substitution possibilities that the overall chain does not su¤er unduly, while in developing countries any problem with a particular link in the chain can doom the project. The importance of intermediate goods and complementarity in development have been examined in more detail recently by Ciccone (2002) and Jones (2009) 
Although meeting the technological constraints may be a necessary condition for the smooth functioning of long production chains, there are episodes that suggest that they may not be su¢ cient. The incentives that operate within the production chain may be an equally important consideration. A glaring example is the breakdown of production chains in the post-Soviet economies of the 1990s. Blanchard and Kremer (1997) coined the term "disorganization" to describe the drastic fall in output and the breakdown of complex production relationships in the countries of the former Soviet Union after 1991 (see also Marin and Schnitzer (2004) ). These authors attribute the fall in output to hold-up problems arising from bargaining between newly decentralized …rms, and the recursive nature of the rent-seeking along the production chain that undermine complex production relationships.
A less extreme, but no less illuminating recent case is the problems a-icting the production chain for Toyota Motor Corporation, which has su¤ered a higly publicized spate of safety-related recalls of its vehicles around the world. Much of the commentary surrounding the recalls have focused on the breakdown in the smooth function of Toyota's supply chain 1 . Toyota's travails have focused attention on the way that the automotive industry operates as a complex web of suppliers. Tier one suppliers (such as Bosch, Delphi, Denso, etc.) deliver integrated systems to the …nal car manufacturers, but fanning out from the tier one suppliers are tier two supliers who provide individual parts or assembled components either directly to the car makers or to the tier one suppliers. There may be suppliers yet further out, who often make a single component for several tier-two suppliers.
In the case of Toyota, much of the commentary has focused on the attempt by Toyota to economize on the costs of its components by pressing its suppliers. Toyota's policy of "value innovation" had the stated goal of reducing the cost of its supplier components by 30% (Wall Street Journal (2009) ). Much of the commentary analyzing Toyota's problems have focused on the way in which the push to cut costs have undermined the traditional linkages between Toyota and its traditional sub-contractors. Indeed, Toyota's traditional model of supply chain management had been the subject of extensive study of the Japanese model of manufacturing that relies on the long-term relationships and close cooperation in a multi-layered production relationship 2 .
Toyota's recent di¢ culties stand as a cautionary tale of the importance of incentives that operate within the production chain. Our paper is an attempt to shed light on this issue, and thereby shed further light on the sustainability of complex production chains. As well as the technological fragility of complex production chains that have been the subject of study by development economists, we point to the potential fragility of production chains that arise due to incentive problems within the chain, and the role of …nancial linkages in mitigating such fragility.
Our focus will be on the …nancial counterparts of the production relationships between …rms as suppliers and customers in the production chain. A …rm's accounts receivable is a claim against customer …rms in the production chain; i.e. the downstream …rms. Equivalently, the downstream …rm's accounts payable is a liability backed by its assets, including its own accounts receivable against …rms yet further down the production chain. In this way, accounts receivable and payable generate a chain of interlocking claims and obligations that bind the interests of the …rms within the production chain.
The fact that accounts receivable are junior claims makes their value sensitive to the success of the project as a whole. In e¤ect, each upstream …rm is a stake-holder in the project that results in the sale of the …nal good.
Our framework sheds light on a puzzle raised in the trade credit literature -namely, why …rms persist in maintaining large stocks of accounts payable and receivable, even though some industries have substantial discounts for prompt cash settlement (see the survey evidence in Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) ). A commonly encountered invoicing practice is the so-called "2-10 net 30"contract, meaning that if the invoice is settled within ten days, there is a discount of 2%, and otherwise the invoice must be paid within 30 days (without discount). The implied interest rate for the additional 20 days of credit comes out at over 40% in annualized terms. Our approach suggests one possible avenue in addressing this apparent puzzle. Financial linkages are important in serving as the "glue"that ties …rms together in their supply chain management.
Our approach is also consistent with the large weight of accounts payable and receivable on corporate balance sheets. Rajan and Zingales (1995, p. 1428) report that accounts receivable constitute fully 18% of total assets for U.S. …rms, and the …gures are higher for Germany (27%), France (29%), Japan (23%), and the United Kingdom (22%). We revisit the empirical evidence in our paper, and show that the cross-section relationships between sales, receivables and payables conform to the key predictions of the theory.
The preliminary evidence suggests that there may be mileage in extending the conventional approach to corporate …nance based on the single …rm to one that examines how corporate …nancial decisions are arrived at as the result of the interaction among …rms, and thus how corporate …nancial decisions and industrial structure are determined jointly.
The outline of our paper is as follows. In the next section, we present our theoretical framework for the role of interlocking claims and obligations in a production chain. We show how the incentive structure within the production chain introduces "recursive moral hazard" that places limits on the complexity of production chains that are more stringent than the limits that arise from purely technological concerns. In this context, we show We go on to review some empirical evidence on receivables and payables in the light of our theory, and examine preliminary cross-country empirical evidence on the way that corporate balance sheets mirror industrial structure.
Although our main contribution is theoretical, the preliminary empirical results support the key predictions of our theory and point to a rich set of hypotheses that would reward further study.
Production Chain
We model a linear hierarchical industrial structure where …rms are arranged into a single chain, as illustrated in Figure 1 . There is one …rm, labelled as …rm 0, that sells the …nal output. The other …rms produce intermediate inputs that are necessary in the production of the …nal good. Firm i + 1 supplies its output to …rm i. In addition to …rm 0, there are N upstream …rms. There is a "time to build" element in the production. Each step of the production process takes precisely one period of time, where time is indexed by t 2 f0; 1; 2; g. Firm i incurs a production cost of w i , which must draw on the …rm's cash holdings, and cannot be deferred. We may interpret w i as the wage costs of …rm i.
One unit of the …nal good can be sold every period inde…nitely into the future for the price q > 0, but there is a probability that the product becomes obsolete. When the product becomes obsolete, the cash ‡ow ceases and all …rms in the chain have liquidation value of zero. Obsolescence can happen in the initial period, even before the …rst cash ‡ow arrives at date N .
The probability of obsolescence depends on the e¤ort exerted by the …rms in the production chain. If all …rms exert high e¤ort, then the probability of obsolescence is H , but if one or more …rms exert low e¤ort, the probability increases to L , where L > H . Conditional on the product not being obsolete, the cash ‡ows of the …rms (before any transfers take place) can be depicted as in Table 1 . Our focus is on the sustainability of the production chain once the …nal product begins earning cash ‡ow from date N + 1 onwards.
E¢ cient Benchmark
We …rst examine the benchmark case where the only limit to the sustainability of the production chain is the technological break-even constraint in the absence of any incentive problems.
Viewed from t = 0, the present value of wage costs for the production chain is given by
while the present value of output of the production chain is
The technological break-even constraint requires that the net present value be non-negative -that is:
which yields the condition:
We can interpret this condition as follows. The left hand side of (4) is the per period revenue in expected terms, while the right hand side is the discounted cumulative cost for the whole chain. Condition (4) will serve as the benchmark for the welfare results to follow.
Recursive Moral Hazard
We now return to the constraint on the sustainability of the production chain that results from the incentive structure within the chain.
Once the …nal product begins to generate a cash ‡ow, the revenue cascades back up the production chain. A …rm has the choice of two actionshigh e¤ort or low e¤ort. Low e¤ort by …rm i can be interpreted as the decision to economize on the cost of producing …rm i's intermediate good, and to divert the resulting cost saving to alternative uses that result in private bene…t, but is detrimental to the success of the …nal output. 
where b > 0 is common to all …rms. If …rm i exerts low e¤ort today, the probability of obsolescence increases to L once the …nal good goes on sale i + 1 periods ahead. When …rm i has exerted high e¤ort at every date in the past, the expected payo¤ from exerting high e¤ort at all subsequent dates is
The payo¤ to deviating to low e¤ort today for one period is
So, the incentive compatibility constraint against a one period deviation to low e¤ort is
where b i is the positive constant de…ned as
As well as the one period deviation, the …rm has other possible deviations (for instance, a permanent deviation to low e¤ort). It turns out, however, that the incentive compatibility constraint (8) is su¢ cient to rule out all other possible deviations from high e¤ort. Appendix A provides the argument.
The constraint (8) captures the recursive moral hazard inherent in our model. The moral hazard is recursive in the sense that the payment to …rm i must be su¢ ciently large so as to induce it not to take the private bene…t, but the payment to …rm i also includes the rent that is due to its supplier …rm, i + 1. In turn, the payment p i+1 includes rents that accrue to suppliers further up the chain.
The optimal contract solves for the prices fp i g that maximize the expected surplus of …rm 0, subject to the incentive compability constraints (8) for all upstream …rms, and the participation (break-even) constraints of all upstream …rms. Equivalently, we can think of the problem as a sequence of overlapping bilateral contracting problems, where …rm i acts as principal with respect to …rm i + 1, but acts as agent with respect to …rm i 1.
Participation Constraint
The participation constraint for …rm i is that it breaks even in expected terms. The …nancing of the initial triangle of costs before cash ‡ows materialize will necessitate compensation for working capital. As a precursor for our main discussion, we will …rst examine the participation constraint in the absence of accounts receivable for a benchmark economy. In what follows, we will assume that the incentive problems are large in that
We procced to show that in the absence of a role for accounts receivable, the participation constraint is lax whenever the incentive constraint binds.
The participation constraint for …rm i is that it breaks even in expected terms. For this section only, assume that a …rm pays its supplier without delay. Consider the net present value of …rm i's cash ‡ows viewed from the …rst date that it incurs cost of production. Firm i's cash ‡ows are the combination of three risky perpetuities.
wage cost w i per period, starting immediately revenue p i per period, starting with a delay of one period, re ‡ecting "time to build" input cost p i+1 per period, starting immediately.
Thus, the participation constraint is
which simpli…es to p i
Under condition (10), it can be shown that
The left hand side of (13) is the threshold value of the incentive compatible p i , while the right hand side is the price p i that satis…es the participation constraint. In other words, under the condition (10), the participation constraint is slack whenever the incentive constraint is binding. Hence the original optimization problem is equivalent to the choice of prices to maximize the expected surplus subject only to the IC constraint. We re-introduce the participation constraint in the next section, when we introduce non-trivial accounts receivable.
The payments fp i g that maximize the discounted expected pro…t for …rm 0 subject only to the incentive compatibility constraints are given by
The prices fp i g incorporate rents fb k w k g for all the upstream …rms k along the production chain. Production of the …nal good is feasible only when 1 H q p 1 + w 0 , and the optimal contract minimizes p 1 subject to the constraints. Equation (14) illustrates well how long production chains are di¢ cult to sustain, not only because of the technological/logistical concerns but also because of the viability of production in the face of incentive problems.
In particular, there is now an e¢ ciency wedge where the production chain is technologically e¢ cient, but is not sustainable due to recursive moral hazard. Compared to the e¢ cient benchmark given by (4), the wedge is created when there is a gap between the cumulative cost along the chain, given by P N k=0 1 (1 H ) k w k , and the costs that incorporate the recursive rents along the chain, given by w 0 + P N k=1 (1 + b k ) w k . Since b k > 0 for all k, the gap between the technologically e¢ cient organization of production and the incentive compatible organization of production can be very large when the coe¢ cients fb k g are large.
We will now show how the introduction of accounts receivable can mitigate the incentive problems within the production chain, but only at the cost of introducing substantial working capital that dissipate the recursive rents.
Accounts Receivable
We introduce accounts receivable by allowing non-trivial delays in the payment between …rms. Suppose that …rm i begins to receive payments from its customer …rm (…rm i 1) after a delay of d i periods after …rst incurring costs of production for the …rst batch of the intermediate good. Suppose also that the customer …rm amortizes its accounts payable by means of a perpetuity with constant payment a i p i . The "a"stands for "amortization".
The idea is that the steady state payments between …rms incorporates an implicit repayment ‡ow for the trade credit that has been granted between …rms. The amortization payment will be the acturially fair repayment for the trade credit granted between …rms.
When taking account of the amortization payments, the per-period payment from i 1 to i gross of the underlying sale price is called the invoice price, and is given by:
In the presence of amortization payments, the incentive compatibility constraint is given by
The optimal contract solves for fp i g and fa i g that maximize …rm 0's pro…t from the production chain subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) and participation (IR) constraints of all upstream …rms.
Relaxing IC Constraint Through Delayed Payment
The introduction of accounts receivables means that the IC and IR constraints are now linked. If the IR constraint is slack, it is possible to relax the IC constraint by raising a i by increasing the payment delay d i -that is,
by allowing the accumulation of larger accounts receivable. The economic intuition is that the accounts receivable of …rm i constitutes a stake held by …rm i in the project as a whole, thereby binding the interests of the …rm to the production chain as a whole. In this way, the introduction of delays in payment and the consequent accumulation of inter…rm claims can relax the incentive constraint within the production chain. Thus, the expected net present value of …rm i's cash ‡ows is
The participation constraint for …rm i requires that V i 0. Letting (17) hold with equality and substituting into the expression for V i , the participation constraint can be expressed as:
where 
Achieving E¢ ciency Through Delayed Payment
The introduction of accounts receivable and payable reduces total rents along the production chain enabling longer production chains to be feasible. Indeed, we have the result that the technologically e¢ cient outcome is achievable through the holding of accounts receivable and payable throughout the chain provided that …rms have su¢ cient working capital to sustain production in the early stages while the inter-…rm claims are being built up.
To state the result more formally, recall the e¢ cient benchmark for the sustainability of the production chain given by equation (4) where the sole constraint is breaking even under the technological constraint. We reproduce it below.
The interpretation of (20) is that the expected per period revenue of the chain covers the cumulative costs along the chain. Say that the production chain is technologically e¢ cient whenever (20) holds. The optimal contract maximizes the pro…t of …rm 0 subject to the IC and IR constraints of all upstream …rms. We say that the production chain is sustainable if the expected pro…t of …rm 0 is non-negative under the optimal contract. Our main result can then be stated as follows.
Proposition 1 For any technologically e¢ cient production chain, there is a pro…le of delays fd i g N i=1 such that the production chain is sustainable.
The introduction of the optimal amount (and pro…le) of accounts receivable allows the relaxation of the IC constraints by using up any slack in the IR constraints so that any technological e¢ cient production chain can be sustained via the optimal pattern of accumulated inter-…rm claims, where the inter-…rm claims arise through delayed payments.
The optimal pattern of delays fd i g N i=1 (i.e. the pattern of delays that arise in the optimal contract) can be solved recursively, starting with …rm N . The optimal contract solves for longest delay d i which satis…es (19) given d i+1 for its upstream …rm. Indeed, as shown in Appendix B, it is possible to solve for d i in closed form, to give:
Our framework points to the important distinction between the invoice price (1 + a i ) p i and the underlying fundamental price p i . The invoice price incorporates the implicit amortization of accounts receivable, while the underlying fundamental price strips out the amortization component.
The intuition for our main result is that the invoice price incorporates a repayment component for the implicit inter-…rm credit, so that the invoice price is higher than the fundamental price of the intermediate good given by p i . From (17), the incentive constraint is expressed in terms of the invoice price only, namely:
The device of inter-…rm credit thereby provides an additional degree of freedom by driving a wedge between the true underlying transactions price from the invoice price. In particular, the use of optimal delays in payment within the chain means that the fundamental price can be lowered relative to the invoice price so that rents along the chain can be dissipated and e¢ ciency is restored.
The proof of Proposition 1 can be given through the explicit solution of the fundamental prices fp i g in the optimal contract when the pattern of delays fd i g is chosen optimally. In Appendix C, we show that the fundamental price p i in the optimal contract is given by
The special case when i = 0 boils down to (20) where p 0 = q. Thus, demonstrating that (23) holds in the optimal contract su¢ ces to prove Proposition 1. Appendix C provides the detailed argument.
Working Capital
A …rm's accounts receivable is the total lending by that …rm to others, while accounts payable is the total borrowing. The di¤erence between the two must be …nanced by the …rm's working capital. The implementation of the optimal pattern of delays to achieve e¢ ciency is therefore predicated on there being su¢ cient working capital at the level of the individual …rms. We now turn our attention to the pro…le of working capital implied by the optimal contract.
Neglecting the integer constraints on fd i g, we can approximate the participation constraint for …rm i by setting the net present value (18) of …rm i to zero. That is, by setting V i = 0. Rearranging this equation, and from the binding IC and IR constraints, we have:
Equation (24) has the following interpretation. In the optimal contract, the ‡ow payment from the net accounts receivable (given by a i p i a i+1 p i+1 ) plus the premium p i p i+1 w i is just large enough to overcome the moral hazard temptation b i w i . We can write (24) more succintly by de…ning i as
Then (24) can be written as
where i is de…ned as
Equation (26) predicts two patterns in the cross-section of receivables and payables. First, the model predicts a positive cross-section relationship between accounts receivable and payable. The larger is accounts payable (i.e. the larger is a i+1 p i+1 ) the larger is accounts receivable. Second, as we show below, the i coe¢ cients are positive for all upstream …rms, so that these …rms have positive net receivables. Indeed, from the steps used in solving for the pro…le of prices in the optimal contract 4 , we can solve for i in closed form as follows.
This gives a closed-form solution for i .
From our assumption (10), we have i > 0 for all i.
The solution for i gives an important insight into the pro…le of working capital in the production chain. The working capital necessary is captured in i , which from (29) can be seen to be a re ‡ection of the recursive moral hazard component b i . Thus, longer production chains entails greater demands on working capital, and hence will be more di¢ cult to sustain in developing countries or during …nancial crises when working capital is scarce. Moreover, …rms that are higher up in the production chain will be burdened more by the need to hold working capital.
We summarize our …ndings as follows. First, we summarize the …nding in equation (26) as follows Proposition 2 Keeping …xed i w i , higher accounts payable is associated with higher accounts receivable.
The empirical counterpart to this proposition is of interest, especially since it goes against a simple classi…cation of …rms into creditor …rms and debtor …rms. Rather, the proposition suggests that the largest creditor …rms are also the largest debtor …rms. We will review the empirical evidence in the next section.
We can also summarize our …ndings that upstream …rms have higher required working capital (or net receivables) as re ‡ected in the pro…le of f i g as follows.
Proposition 3 The working capital required in the optimal contract is higher for upstream …rms.
Our solution for f i g and the increased demand for working capital for upstream …rms is also re ‡ected in the size of inter…rm credit relative to total sales. The ratio of receivables to sales is proportional to
. We can show that in the optimal contract,
We prove this by induction, backward from N . The lemma holds for i = N .
For the inductive step, note that from (26) and the fact that the IC constraint (16) binds with equality, we can write
By the induction hypothesis, (31) and simplifying gives (30). This proves (30). Using our explicit solution for i given by (29), we have the following closed-form solution:
For the special case where w i = w for all i, it follows that a i (and hence also d i ) are an increasing function of i. That is, upstream …rms build up more accounts receivables by longer delays in payments. Therefore, longer production chains make greater demands on working capital, and …rms higher up the chain bear a greater burden than …rms lower down in the chain.
Cobb-Douglas Representation
We will now argue for the usefulness of the following Cobb-Douglas representation of receivables in the cross-section of …rms log (receivables) ' + " log (payables) + (1 ") log (sales)
We do so by showing that the cross-section elasticity " is determined by the length of the production chain and the degree of vertical integration. Before demonstrating this claim formally, it is useful to give some intuition.
In our model, …rms hold receivables so as to have a stake in the project as a whole. The stake is measured by the size of the …rm's net receivables.
When a …rm has large accounts payable, it must hold correspondingly large accounts receivable to achieve a given size of stake. When …rm i is large relative to …rm i + 1, the need to hold large receivables derives mainly from …rm i's own value-added, rather than from the value of intermediate inputs from its upstream supplier. If the value of the intermediate input is small, …rm i has low payables to …rm i + 1 and there is no need to hold very large receivables in order to have a su¢ cient stake in the production chain. So, if …rm i is large relative to …rm i + 1, receivables are explained mainly by …rm i's sales, rather than by its payables. For this reason, the elasticity " is lower in production chains where …rm size increases rapidly going downstream.
Let us demonstrate this claim more formally. Note that (33) can be written as log receivables sales ' + " log payable sales so that " is the elasticity of the ratio of receivables to sales with respect to the ratio of payables to sales. By using the ‡ow counterparts to these quantities, we write
Hence, i is proportional to the receivables to sales ratio, while i is proportional to the payables to sales ratio. Hence, " is the elasticity of i with respect to i . Let
Here, " (i; i + 1) is the elasticity of the receivables to sales ratio with respect to the payables to sales ratio going upstream from …rm i to …rm i + 1. Using our solution for the optimal contract,
We are interested in how " (i; i + 1) changes as w i becomes large. We know from our solutions for a k and p k that all quantities with subscripts i + 1 and higher are una¤ected by changes in w i . As w i becomes large, the numerator of (35) is bounded away from zero. However, the denominator of (35) increases without bound. Hence " (i; i + 1) ! 0 as w i ! 1.
In other words, as the size of …rm i increases for any …xed pro…le of …rm sizes upstream from i, the elasticity " (i; i + 1) becomes small. By selecting a pro…le for …rm sizes fw i g that increases su¢ ciently quickly going downstream in the production chain, we can make the elasticities f" (i; i + 1)g as low as
we please.
In particular, if we con…ne our attention to size pro…les fw i g that give rise to constant elasticities along the production chain so that " (i; i + 1) = ", for all i, a low cross-section elasticiy " is associated with a high degree of vertical integration. Our reasoning suggests the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis. " is low for production chains with high vertical integration.
The elasticity " is the coe¢ cient on log (payables) in the Cobb-Douglas representation (33). Thus, our hypothesis is that the cross-section elasticity of receivables with respect to payables in the Cobb-Douglas representation is low for production chains with greater vertical integration.
Preliminary Look at Data
Although our contribution is intended primarily as a theoretical one, it is possible to o¤er some encouraging preliminary evidence for the cross-section of accounts receivable. For this preliminary look at the data, we have chosen the Compustat Global database of …rms, for one particular year, 2003. The
Compustat Global data has some advantages for cross-country comparisons due to the e¤ort made at comparability. The documentation states that the "data is normalized according to country accounting principles, disclosure methods and speci…c data item de…nitions."
The literature on trade credit has sought to explain the large size of accounts receivable on company balance sheets by pointing to the comparative advantage that a supplier …rm has in acting as a creditor to the downstream …rm (as compared to a bank or other third party creditors). Biais and Gollier (1997) , Cuñat (2006) and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) give an overview of the rationales put forward to date. In addition, a large empirical literature on trade credit has sought to disentangle the competing hypotheses by examining the empirical determinants of a company's accounts receivable based on the company's individual characteristics (see Petersen and Rajan (1997) , Fisman and Love (2003) , Giannetti, Burkart and Ellingsen (2006) and the references therein).
However, by taking a bilateral contracting perspective between creditor and debtor, we may slip into the presumption that …rms fall into two groups -creditor …rms and debtor …rms. However, the evidence paints a very di¤erent picture. Begin with Figure 2 , which shows a scatter chart of the log of accounts receivable against log of annual sales for manufacturing …rms in Japan in our sample. We removed inactive …rms from the sample, as well as those that did not report …gure for either receivables or payables. There are 1198 …rms in scatter plot. The slope 5 of the OLS regression is very close to 1, suggesting that the hypothesis of a proportional relationship between accounts receivable and sales may be a good place to start. If the economy as a whole had a …xed, conventional invoicing period that all …rms adhered to, then total sales would explain accounts receivable.
The bilateral contracting perspective on trade credit has emphasized borrowing constraints on …rms, and why they must borrow from their suppliers rather than from outside investors. Credit constrained …rms would …nd it di¢ cult to lend to other …rms, implying that …rms that borrow more are those that lend less. However, the evidence paints a very di¤erent picture. 
Cobb-Douglas Elasticities
Drawing on the Cobb-Douglas representation of receivables (33), we run cross-section OLS regressions for manufacturing …rms (NAICS codes 31 -33) of the form:
log (receivables) = + log (payables) + log (sales)
for 9 countries. They include the seven countries examined by Rajan and Zingales in their 1995 paper (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K. The coe¢ cient on log payables is positive for all countries, as predicted by the theory. The numerical magnitudes di¤er widely across the various countries in ways that are consistent with the received wisdom on the degree of vertical integration in these countries. Figure 4 plots the coe¢ cients for ease of reference. The standard errors are indicated by the crosses. We note the following observations. 1. The estimates for most countries lie on, or close to the diagonal line in Figure 4 , suggesting that the Cobb-Douglas representation of receivables with constant returns to scale may be a promising basis for more detailed investigations.
2. Countries that have conventionally been associated with small and medium sized enterprises, and with correspondingly low degrees of vertical integration (such as Japan, Taiwan and Italy) have higher coef…cients for log payable, consistent with our hypothesis on the inverse relationship between " and the degree of vertical integration.
3. In contrast, the "Anglo-Saxon"countries (U.S., Canada and the U.K.) shows low elasticity. The coe¢ cient estimates line up along the diagonal line in Figure 5 , as suggested by the theory. We also report the Her…ndahl index for sales, de…ned as P i s 2 i where s i is the sale of …rm i as a proportion of total sales in the sample for that country. The index is higher for the U.S. than for Japan, consistent with the evidence from the elasticities that small and medium sized …rms play a more prominent role in Japan.
Concluding Remarks
We have argued for the importance of the interactions between corporate …nance and industrial structure. The common thread linking these two notions is the importance of working capital. The main lesson from our investigation is that the constraints placed on the production chain by the interaction of incentives along the chain may play an important role in the sustainability of production chains over and above the technological constraints. Also, we have seen that the …nancial relationships along production chains may be an e¤ective way to mitigate the incentive problems along the chain.
There are important implications for economic development. Since the holding of accounts receivable and payable are only possible due to the pool of working capital, our results suggest that …nancial development is also an important precursor for the development of long production chains. In this sense, our results are complementary to the large development literature that has emphasized the importance of technological constraints in limiting the complexity of production relationships.
There are many avenues of further research. One strand is the role of …nance in economic development. In an economy where the SME sector is well capitalized, and …nancially sound, our model predicts that there are bene…cial incentive e¤ects of the SMEs supporting large balance sheets. As well as Japan, some European countries (notably Italy) have large and in‡uential SME sectors. In contrast, the U.S. is known to be more vertically integrated than Japan or some of the European countries.
Our paper represents a small step in the study of the interactions between industrial structure and corporate …nance. The next steps are to use the insights we can gain in order to address the the diversity seen in crosscountry studies of corporate balance sheets. The message of our paper is that industrial structure and corporate …nance are inextricably linked.
Appendix A
In this appendix, we show that the incentive compatibility constraint (8) against a single period deviation from high e¤ort is su¢ cient to rule out other possible deviations from high e¤ort. We argue in two steps. First, consider the deviation when …rm i switches to permanently low e¤ort. The expected payo¤ from permanently low e¤ort is
The payo¤ to exerting high e¤ort at all future dates is
The incentive compatibility constraint against a permanent deviation to low e¤ort is p i p i+1 + 1 +b i w i
whereb i is the positive constant de…ned aŝ
which is identical to the constant b i de…ned in (9) for the one period deviation. Thus, the incentive compatibility constraint for the permanent deviation is identical to the one-period deviation. Now consider any deviation other than a permanent deviation. There must then be a last period of low e¤ort, beyond which the …rm exerts high e¤ort. When the …rm arrives at this last period of deviation, the choice between low and high e¤ort is identical to the choice between a one period deviation and high e¤ort at all future dates, except for the recent history. Since the sign of the payo¤ di¤erence is not a¤ected by the recent history, the incentive compatibility constraint against the one period deviation su¢ ces to deter the …rm from going ahead with low e¤ort. Thus, the incentive compatibility constraint against a one period deviation su¢ ces as the incentive compatibiltiy constraint against any deviation.
Appendix B
In this appendix, we give a closed-form solution to the pro…le of delays fd i g. Setting V i = 0 in equation (18) and rearranging, we have
By recursive substitution,
Using the binding IC constraint (
from which we can solve for d i as
which should be equal to the present value of a perpetuity of a i p i that the supplier …rm will receive
By equating the two expressions, we have
In Appendix B, we showed that
From this, we have the closed-form solution for the price of intermediate goods as
